Abstract
Traditional power management for secure memory operations often depends on external software to identify and request high‑voltage rails before sending commands to a secure entity. This reliance may create synchronization risks where memory programming might begin before power is stable, and involves non‑secure components inspecting secure directives, potentially exposing sensitive information. This publication describes a hardware‑interlocked handshake mechanism between a Root‑of‑Trust and a Power Manager to manage power rails on‑demand. The Root‑of‑Trust independently identifies the request for high‑voltage power and asserts a hardware request signal. The Power Manager receives a hardware interrupt, enables the indicated power rail, and returns a hardware acknowledgment signal. A hardware interlock within the Root‑of‑Trust restricts memory operations until the Root‑of‑Trust receives this acknowledgment. This mechanism facilitates atomic synchronization and maintains the principle of least privilege by encapsulating power requests within the secure hardware environment.
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Sinha, Rohit; Kazi, Naved; and Vijay, Anchal, "Hardware‑Interlocked Power Request Signaling for Secure Root‑of‑Trust Operations", Technical Disclosure Commons, (April 24, 2026)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/9924