Abstract
Apple has said that, because of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), it cannot ship its new Siri AI assistant in the EU with its latest iPhone and iPad software. Apple says the interoperability requirements, as interpreted by regulators, would require giving third-party AI systems near-unlimited device access and the ability to act autonomously without the user’s ongoing visibility and control, including reading and sending messages, making purchases and accessing files. The European Commission replies that the decision not to launch is Apple’s alone, and that Apple did not offer interoperability solutions meeting essential EU privacy and security standards. The Commission maintains that the DMA can be complied with without weakening privacy protections. The dispute turns on a technical question: can competing AI assistants be given equal access to device functions without giving any assistant unrestricted authority to act? appleithinkdiff
Based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026, and Indian Provisional Filing 202631127058, filed 25 October 2026 (as identified by the applicant).
This paper proposes a security architecture as a possible answer. It rests on one principle: separate the request for a device action from the authority to perform it. Third-party assistants reach device functions on equal terms with the platform’s own assistant, while control over irreversible actions such as payments, messages, file exports and device actuation stays with the device. Each requested action stays non-effective until a hardware-isolated enforcement domain validates a fixed set of conditions and issues a single-use, non-transferable capability, and a final enforcement point re-checks that capability at the moment of effect and refuses the action if anything has changed. Access to the interface is open to every assistant, but authority to cause an effect is scoped to the specific operation, tied to the user’s current grant, and cannot be reused or handed on. Operations that are refused leave evidence that the platform, the assistant provider, the user and a regulator can inspect. zenodo.org
The paper also considers European digital sovereignty. Jurisdiction-bound and region-bound policy, user-controlled authority and audit evidence held by European operators can be expressed as policy conditions checked at the enforcement point. This reduces dependence on any single gatekeeper’s discretion over what rival assistants may do. It does not by itself guarantee data residency or provider independence. The approach is compared with application sandboxing, OAuth, human confirmation, access-control policy engines and monitoring. The author describes it as independent, non-peer-reviewed research with conceptual performance figures, and the linked reference implementation is a user-space demonstrator, not certified software or proof of DMA compliance. It covers only the paths that pass the enforcement point, and it cannot protect against a fully compromised operating-system kernel. zenodo.org
This paper takes no side on the legal questions in the dispute. It makes no claim about Apple’s, the Commission’s or any other party’s conduct, and nothing in it is an endorsement, validation or infringement statement about any company or product. It does not claim that the approach satisfies Article 6(7) of the DMA or any other legal obligation.
Where to read the full PCT filing: search “Sangam Das” on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in TD Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/. A related public record is on Zenodo: https://zenodo.org/records/22053979.
Disclaimer: This abstract and the drafting were prepared with AI assistance. Readers must cross-check them against the original disclosures, the PCT filings and other public sources before drawing any conclusion. Statements about the dispute reflect public sources as of 17 November 2026 and may have changed.
License: CC BY-NC 4.0.
Keywords
AI Safety, Trustworthy AI, Apple Siri, Siri AI, Apple Intelligence, Digital Markets Act (DMA), DMA Article 6(7), DMA Interoperability Obligation, DMA Specification Decision, DMA Gatekeeper, European Commission, EU Digital Sovereignty, European Digital Sovereignty, Sovereign AI, EU Technology Sovereignty, Third-Party AI Assistant Interoperability, Interoperability Without Unrestricted Access, Virtual Assistant Interoperability, iOS Interoperability, iPadOS, Mobile Operating System Security, Agentic AI Security, AI Agent Security, Autonomous AI Agents, AI Assistant Device Access, On-Device AI Security, Runtime Authorization, Least Privilege, Zero Trust Architecture, Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Reference Monitor, Complete Mediation, Hardware-Isolated Enforcement, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Secure Enclave, Confidential Computing, Hardware Root of Trust, Remote Attestation, Single-Use Capability, Non-Transferable Capability, Non-Bearer Authorization, Capability-Based Security, Scoped Authorization, Sender-Constrained Authorization, Anti-Replay Protection, Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Prevention, Confused Deputy Prevention, Fail-Closed Enforcement, Revocation Checking, Human Oversight of AI, User Consent and Control, Privacy and Security by Design, Platform Security Versus Competition, Gatekeeper Platform Regulation, Competition Law and AI, EU AI Act, NIS2, Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), GDPR, Data Protection by Design, Jurisdiction-Bound Policy, Data Residency, Auditability, Tamper-Evident Audit Evidence, Regulatory Evidence, Cross-Platform Security, Android Security, iOS Security, Consequence-Bound Authorization, Protected Execution-Finality, Finality Sink, Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domain, Technical Disclosure Commons, Patent-Pending Technical Disclosure
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Recommended Citation
Das, Sangam Kumar, "Resolving Europe DMA - Apple SIRI Dispute - AI Interoperability Without Unrestricted Device Authority: A Security-Preserving Technical Architecture for Apple Siri, Third-Party AI Assistants, and the EU Digital Markets Act", Technical Disclosure Commons, ()
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/13136