Abstract

Abstract

An operating system may authenticate an application, a device may recognize a permission, a cloud service may accept a token, an AI agent may hold a tool credential and a remote application may receive a command. None of this shows that the operation actually about to take effect is still within the originating authority, scope, current policy and resource state. The problem is harder across platforms. Permissions with similar names can mean different things on different systems. A cloud credential says who is calling, not which operation will take effect. When an unfinished operation moves from a phone to a cloud service, copying its state does not show whether the old device can still act. When an agent tool is updated, its effects can change while its name stays the same.

Based on Indian Provisional Filing 202631127058, filed 25 October 2026 (as identified by the applicant), and the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026.

This paper describes an informational architecture for preserving an equivalent protected authorization relationship across Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Linux, cloud services, trusted hardware, edge devices and autonomous AI agents, even though their permission models and security mechanisms differ. Qualified native evidence from each platform is translated into a protected canonical operation descriptor. A scoped, non-bearer authorization is then created. The receiving enforcement point at the resource boundary reconstructs the operation that is actually about to execute and checks current authority, policy, revocation status and resource state before the effect is allowed.

The paper covers assessment of each platform’s enforcement capability, cross-device ownership transfer with fencing of the old device, authorization that is consumed once used, receipt-gated continuation, protected reauthorization, revocation and offline limits, tool updates and agent-to-agent hand-offs, and recovery after failure. It maps the mechanisms to technologies that exist today, such as credential brokers, trusted execution environments, secure elements, hardware security modules, attestation services and transactional state, and states which component can provide each assurance.

The paper is explicit about limits. It claims no protection beyond the paths the enforcement point covers. It cannot resist a fully compromised kernel, and it claims no global exactly-once execution, instantaneous revocation, certification or performance results. Enforcement sits at consequential boundaries, not at every instruction or model inference. It is an individual informational proposal, not a standard, regulatory compliance statement or endorsement by any company.

Where to read the full PCT filing: search “Sangam Das” on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in TD Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.

Disclaimer: This abstract and the drafting were prepared with AI assistance. Readers must cross-check them against the original disclosures, the PCT filings and other public sources before drawing any conclusion.

License: CC BY-NC 4.0.

Keywords

AI Safety, Trustworthy AI, Agentic AI Security, AI Agent Security, Autonomous AI Agents, Autonomous Systems Security, Cross-Platform Security, Cross-Platform AI Agent Security, Cross-Device Security, Heterogeneous Computing Security, Runtime Authorization, Authorization Continuity, Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Zero Trust Architecture, Reference Monitor, Complete Mediation, Non-Bypassable Execution Control, Consequence-Bound Authorization, Protected Execution-Finality, Resource-Side Enforcement, Android Security, iOS Security, macOS Security, Windows Security, Linux Security, Cloud Security, Edge Device Security, Mobile Application Permissions, Permission Model Interoperability, Confidential Computing, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Hardware Root of Trust, Hardware Security Module (HSM), Secure Element, Remote Attestation, Credential Broker, Non-Bearer Token, Sender-Constrained Authorization, Capability-Based Security, Least Privilege, Confused Deputy Prevention, Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Prevention, Anti-Replay Protection, Single-Use Authorization, Revocation Checking, Offline Operation Security, Fail-Closed Enforcement, Cross-Device Handoff Security, Device Migration Security, Source Fencing, Split-Brain Prevention, Tool Update Security, Tool-Call Authorization, Model Context Protocol (MCP) Security, Agent-to-Agent (A2A) Security, Agent Delegation Security, Multi-Agent Systems Security, Software Supply Chain Security, Tamper-Evident Audit Evidence, Evidence-Carrying Receipts, Independent Effect Verification, Outcome Reconciliation, Failure Recovery, Critical Infrastructure Security, Cyber-Physical Systems Security, Operational Technology (OT) Security, Digital Sovereignty, EU AI Act, NIS2, Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), IETF Internet-Draft, Patent-Pending Technical Disclosure, Technical Disclosure Commons, Canonical Effect Descriptor, Finality Sink, Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcem

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

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