Abstract

Abstract (Part 21 of 27)

Consider an AI assistant controlled by organization A cooperating with an assistant operated by organization B. Both accept a project plan and nominate an evaluator. The evaluator reports that a remote transaction has completed and recommends continuing. What technical evidence establishes that this evaluator was actually appointed by the required authorities, that its reviewers do not all depend on one organization or evidence supplier, that a signed report describes an actual effect rather than merely a statement, that dissent was not concealed, and that either organization’s protected resources remain under its own authorization? An evaluator’s public key, model confidence score, reputation, signed report, or majority vote is not by itself an answer.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, substitute selection, pending-work escrow, verified phase advancement, actual-outcome feedback, independent evaluator integrity, cross-domain partition recovery, protected session closure, and cross-organizational supervisor appointment. This embodiment specifically controls independent cross-domain evaluator appointment — specializing the cross-domain authority of E20 into evaluator appointment, independent review, conflict processing, and a separately gated next-phase proposal.

This embodiment (Part 21 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) separates five non-interchangeable propositions: (i) a reviewer exists and is authenticated; (ii) the reviewer is currently authorized for this task; (iii) submitted observations genuinely support an actual outcome under the relevant evidence policy; (iv) the complete, independent review round has reached an eligible result; and (v) the designated resource owner independently permits the precise next operation. Failure of any mandatory proposition leaves dependent operations non-effective. A protected appointment controller derives mandatory evaluator qualifications, the actual reviewer roster, independent control groups, and affected organizational approvers from policy and resource dependencies, rather than from untrusted proposal text. Authenticated resource-origin outcome records are checked against the exact native operation; correlated feedback is not counted as independently authoritative. A protected review round accepts role-bound, freshness-bound evaluator determinations, requires prescribed panel completeness and diversity, preserves dissent, and emits a typed non-executable result. A positive review alone does not authorize an effect. Any next-phase proposal additionally requires current affected-owner authorization and independently revalidated evidence and evaluator authority at the protected admission boundary.

The architecture therefore ensures that cross-domain evaluators are properly appointed, that their reviews rest on genuine independent evidence of actual outcomes, and that neither a signed report nor a favorable review becomes permission to continue.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, independent evaluator appointment, cross-domain review, actual-outcome verification, reviewer accountability, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, collusion-aware review, dissent preservation, dispute containment, execution finality, protected continuation, non-executable review result, control-group independence, resource-owner authorization, review-round closure, separately authorized next-phase proposal.

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Creative Commons License
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