Abstract

Abstract (Part 20 of 27)

In single-company automation, an operator may appoint a planner, evaluator, and project manager under one local administration. When Agent A and Agent B belong to mutually independent companies, however, identity discovery, secure messaging, or a token issued by one company does not establish agreement to a shared project manager. A service may start a supervisor process without authority; an initiator may impersonate both owners; a supervisor may overrun its limited appointment; one party may withdraw while the other retains a stale token; or a combined role may turn schedule approval into resource-effect authority.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, substitute selection, pending-work escrow, verified phase advancement, actual-outcome feedback, independent evaluator integrity, cross-domain partition recovery, and protected session closure. This embodiment specifically controls cross-organizational supervisory appointment — determining who may nominate, authorize, install, and retire a cross-company coordinator, with independent local consent and installation at every required domain.

This embodiment (Part 20 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) forms one typed, proposal-specific, bounded appointment. It obtains independently verifiable consent from every mandatory authority principal under their local rules, installs that appointment at every required protected domain, and admits only defined coordination operations under current policy, role, identity, epoch, deadline, and usage limits. Manager creation is distinguished from manager authorization. Evaluator authority and real-world effect authority remain independent. A coordinator is not trusted to assert its own authority, invent evaluator success, or release protected resources. Expired, withdrawn, replaced, or modified authority is denied; incomplete convergence remains HOLD. No appointment automatically authorizes native resource effects. Cryptographic and non-cryptographic trusted-local variants are disclosed.

The architecture therefore allows independent organizations to appoint a shared supervisor only with verified mutual consent and local installation, while ensuring that coordination authority never silently becomes effect authority.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, cross-organizational supervisor appointment, joint authorization, mandatory approvers, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, revocable supervisor identity, cross-company coordination, execution finality, independently verifiable consent, scope-bound runtime creation, protected local effect authority, installation convergence, coordination-only gateway, appointment generation fencing, non-bearer supervisor authority, independent domain veto.

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Creative Commons License
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