Abstract

Abstract (Part 17 of 27)

An evaluator reports that a task is successful. The evaluator may be compromised, its prompt may be contaminated by evidence disguised as instructions, two apparently different evaluator accounts may be controlled by one organization, its model build may change midway, or all reviewers may rely on the same incorrect telemetry source. A conventional majority vote or valid digital signature can therefore accept an unjustified success classification. The evaluator may also correctly identify an outcome yet issue a recommendation outside its appointment or after revocation. A later agent or resource controller may then treat the recommendation as though it were an execution privilege.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, substitute selection, pending-work escrow, verified phase advancement with completion receipts, and actual-outcome feedback. This embodiment specifically controls independent evaluator integrity — verifying that the evaluators and their evidence dependencies themselves satisfy anti-corruption and independence rules before their output can become a permitted premise of subsequent action.

This embodiment (Part 17 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) makes acceptance of evaluator output a separate verifiable state transition. Protected context must be current; material observations must be traceable to eligible, sufficiently independent sources; each evaluator must be eligible for the exact role and evaluation instance; independence and conflict-of-interest constraints are applied to underlying administrative control groups, not mere account counts; dissent and contradictory authoritative observations are not averaged into success; and independent organizational and native resource authorization must still be verified at the point of effect. No part of the design assumes that a signature proves factual truth or that a committee eliminates collusion. Two signing keys belonging to one administrator are not treated as independent. The resulting oversight result remains non-effective; a distinct resource-owner approval and protected sink check are still required for any following action.

The architecture therefore prevents colluding, correlated, or compromised evaluators from silently converting an unjustified success classification into permission to continue.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, evaluator integrity, source provenance, collusion-resistant review, independent evaluation, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, control-group independence, conflict-of-interest detection, dissent preservation, evidence dependency graph, cross-organizational collaboration, execution finality, protected oversight verification, non-effective evaluator output, quorum based on administrative control groups, evaluator equivocation detection, adversarial instruction boundary, independently verified evaluation integrity.

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Creative Commons License
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