Abstract
Abstract (Part 16 of 27)
Agent A and Agent B jointly approve a staged maintenance plan. An independently enforced Phase 1 task is completed with a protected resource-side receipt. Subsequent feedback then arrives from a device monitor, a service audit system, an operator, and a counterparty. Some reports are delayed; two may originate from the same cloud telemetry vendor; one may be signed but incorrect; another may contain a prompt injection instructing an agent to skip approval; and a third may disagree with a measured physical state. If the evaluator treats reports as actual effects, averages correlated sources as if they were independent, or treats its own favorable conclusion as effect permission, the system can execute Phase 2 against unverified assumptions.
Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, substitute selection, pending-work escrow, and verified phase advancement with completion receipts. This embodiment specifically controls verified feedback and actual-outcome evaluation — separating what the execution boundary has confirmed from later reports, and ensuring that neither feedback nor an evaluator conclusion becomes permission for the next operation.
This embodiment (Part 16 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) requires source-attributed feedback, protected evidence provenance, correlation detection, and adversarial feedback containment. It distinguishes four things: an operation that the execution boundary has verified, later reports describing that operation, a decision about what should happen next, and a separately issued authorization permitting an actual next operation. Delayed, duplicate, signed-but-incorrect, injected, or conflicting reports remain classified rather than automatically accepted. The evaluator’s outcome assessment is non-effective; any continuation still requires independent organizational approval and local Finality Sink authorization.
The architecture therefore lets multi-agent systems use post-execution feedback without letting untrusted or correlated reports, or the evaluator’s own conclusion, silently open the next phase.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, verified feedback, actual-outcome evaluation, adversarial feedback containment, protected continuation, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, source-attributed reports, evidence provenance, correlation detection, cross-organizational collaboration, execution finality, prompt-injection resistance in feedback, non-effective outcome assessment, independently authorized next-step, outcome-based continuation control, feedback adjudication.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Recommended Citation
Das, Sangam Kumar, "AI Agent Safety: Feedback Is Not Proof — And Not Permission", Technical Disclosure Commons, (November 05, 2026)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12786