Abstract

Abstract (Part 14 of 27)

After a substitute agent has been selected, the unfinished work still has to move. Agent A may have completed a resource inspection, started an external transfer that timed out, and retained a pending configuration update. Simply copying conversation history, granting A’s API token to the substitute, or placing the same tasks in the substitute’s queue creates four defects: the remote transfer may already have happened, stale workers of A may later resume, another domain’s resource veto may be bypassed, and the substitute may infer that receiving the task confers execution authority. A conventional file copy cannot establish an authoritative state transition among these conditions.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, and risk-triggered substitute selection. This embodiment specifically controls protected pending-work escrow and exact task-state migration — transferring unfinished work to the substitute without transferring the predecessor’s credentials, unproven outcomes, or previously consumed authority.

This embodiment (Part 14 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) establishes a protected escrow of task and consequence state. It separates escrow preparation, destination staging, owner-approved migration commit, and subsequent per-action finality. Source authority is fenced, the destination independently acknowledges the migration, and a non-effective HOLD is preserved until a new, locally checked authorization exists for any continuation. Completed, partial, and unresolved effects remain recorded so that the substitute does not inherit unverified remote outcomes or the predecessor’s consumed authority. The substitute receives the exact unfinished-work state under protected controls, not bearer credentials or an implicit right to act.

The architecture therefore allows safe migration of pending multi-agent work across independently governed domains while ensuring that substitution of the agent never silently transfers authority or unresolved external effects.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, pending-work escrow, task-state migration, substitute reauthorization, source-authority fencing, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, protected work transfer, destination acceptance, cross-organizational collaboration, execution finality, unfinished-work escrow, non-effective migration HOLD, credential non-transfer, unresolved-effect preservation, owner-approved migration commit, exact task-state handoff, independently authorized continuation after substitution.

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Creative Commons License
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