Abstract

Abstract (Part 13 of 27)

After a jointly agreed plan is frozen, a neutral evaluator may determine that one or more participant agents should no longer perform a pending task because of elevated risk, unavailable capacity, loss of trust, deadlock, inability to satisfy policy, or an adverse outcome. Simply directing Agent A to “ask Agent C to finish” leaves unsafe paths open: a still-live worker belonging to A can repeat the operation, C may inherit bearer credentials not intended for it, an incomplete task may conceal an already accepted but unconfirmed remote effect, C can be unqualified for the protected resource, the evaluator may select a colluding candidate, or Domain B may never have approved the substitution. Changing a routing label does not reconcile pending operations, protected state generation, source provenance, or separate ownership vetoes.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, the evaluation snapshot, risk assessment, next-actor selection, plan corrections, agent role reconfiguration, selective single-message communication, the next-move passport, and Finality Sink enforcement. This embodiment specifically controls risk-triggered selection and appointment of a neutral substitute agent, with protected fencing of the original actor’s rights and reauthorization before any continuation.

This embodiment (Part 13 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) implements risk-triggered neutral substitute-agent selection and appointment. Following a jointly agreed plan and verified freeze, the independent evaluator selects an eligible neutral agent or bounded substitute subgroup and produces a constrained, non-effective decision. Separately authorized organizational and resource owners verify the selection. A protected controller then fences old rights, revokes stale actor authority, and establishes a new, narrowly defined pending allocation. Eligibility, appointment, transfer of unfinished work, and actual effectuation remain separate state transitions. No recommendation or allocation is itself a resource-effect authorization; a new, locally checked passport or protected authorization slot is still required before any next action. Appointment is a technical authorization and workflow designation, not a legal hiring event or automatic transfer of economic rights. Completed and unresolved effects are retained in an immutable record. Full protected work escrow is elaborated separately in the next embodiment.

The architecture therefore allows safe replacement of an unsuitable agent across independent domains while ensuring that substitution never silently becomes inherited authority or unapproved effectuation.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, neutral substitute agent, risk-triggered replacement, protected reauthorization, agent appointment, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, actor fencing, stale-actor revocation, cross-organizational collaboration, execution finality, substitute eligibility verification, protected task allocation, non-effective substitute selection, independent owner approval, unfinished-work transfer control, ESCROW_PENDING transition, collusion-resistant substitute selection, independently governed agent replacement.

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Creative Commons License
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