Abstract

Abstract (Part 9 of 27)

When an evaluator discovers that an agent’s assigned role, tool profile, autonomy level, or strategy is unsuitable, ordinary orchestration may simply alter a prompt, select a new tool, expand a service account, launch a worker, or redirect a task. Stale tool credentials, previously scheduled workers, pending API effects, and cached permissions can outlive the nominal change. An agent may also treat a recommendation to become an “executor” as actual permission to perform a payment or physical operation. Role change must remain distinct from authorization for an external effect.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, the evaluation snapshot, risk assessment, next-actor selection, and plan corrections. This embodiment specifically controls safe reconfiguration of an agent’s role, tools, or strategy — ensuring that a role change never silently becomes new authority.

This embodiment (Part 9 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) controls protected runtime reconfiguration of cooperating agents. After the joint plan is committed and frozen, the independent evaluator issues a typed, non-effective reconfiguration decision that identifies the desired role, strategy, tool allowlist, autonomy restrictions, or human-supervision requirement. Each affected domain’s organizational authority controller independently approves the change within its own role ceilings and veto rights; no domain can silently sign for another. Only after owner approval is a versioned capability-enforcement transition installed, with revocation of superseded credentials and fencing of lingering workers or cached permissions. The evaluator cannot, merely by announcing a role change, install permissions in independently governed domains or bypass a resource-side gate. Where the change would alter a committed objective or resource allocation rather than agent configuration alone, fresh multiparty consent and a renewed freeze are required. Any subsequent external effect remains subject to separate local Finality Sink authorization.

The architecture therefore allows controlled, auditable adjustment of agent roles and capabilities across organizations while ensuring that reconfiguration never silently becomes expanded authority or unilateral execution.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, agent role reconfiguration, bounded delegation, protected capability transition, non-effective role change, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, owner-authorized capability update, versioned permission generation, tool-profile revision, autonomy-level adjustment, cross-organizational collaboration, execution finality, stale-credential revocation, protected capability installation, independently enforced role transition, evaluator-directed reconfiguration, capability fencing, non-bearer role modification, multi-agent permission reconfiguration.

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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

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