Abstract
Attackers can circumvent content provenance standards by physically modifying a device to generate valid device attestation reports, allowing the attacker to sign fake digital assets such as images, video, or audio content as authentic assets captured using the device. For example, an attacker may physically interact with and voltage-glitch the device's random-access memory (RAM) to obtain runtime root access, disable security modules, and impersonate an authorized capturing process to generate valid attestation reports. This disclosure describes techniques for revoking certificates assigned to a device detected as having been used to produce a fraudulent digital asset. The techniques involve generating a device revocation token (DRT) from a durable anonymized identifier associated with a device. The device revocation token is embedded into an extension field of a signing certificate during a certificate provisioning process. When a fraudulent digital asset is detected, the corresponding device revocation token and durable anonymized identifier are determined and added to a device revocation list. This list is used to prevent the compromised device from obtaining additional signing certificates and to flag previously signed digital assets as fraudulent.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Rohde, Paul J., "Device-level Revocation of Digital Asset Signing Capabilities", Technical Disclosure Commons, (September 02, 2026)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/11562