Abstract
Field Computer-implemented systems for generating tamper-evident employee assessment records using hardware-enforced trusted execution environments, providing integrity guarantees at the silicon level rather than through application-layer state management. Background Regulated industries require proof that employee assessment records have not been altered. Application-layer approaches manage validity through state machines and cryptographic hash chains verified by the application itself. The approach described here moves the trust anchor to the hardware, using the processor's built-in security features to guarantee record integrity independently of any software. Technical Description The assessment execution environment runs inside a hardware-isolated enclave. Compatible hardware platforms include Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions), AMD SEV-SNP (Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging), AWS Nitro Enclaves, and ARM TrustZone. The enclave is initialized with a verified measurement (MRENCLAVE hash in Intel terminology) that cryptographically confirms the exact assessment code loaded into the enclave before any execution begins. When an employee starts an assessment, the enclave receives the assessment content (questions, answer keys, scoring rubric) as sealed input. The employee's responses are transmitted to the enclave, where the scoring logic executes in hardware-isolated memory inaccessible to the host operating system, hypervisor, or any administrator with root access. Upon completion, the enclave generates a Hardware-Signed Attestation containing: employee_id, assessment_id, content_hash (SHA-256 of the specific questions delivered), response_hash (SHA-256 of the employee's responses), final_score, and timestamp. This attestation is signed using the enclave's private key (derived from the Provisioning Key unique to the hardware platform) and includes a remote attestation report from the hardware manufacturer's attestation service. The attestation record is stored alongside the assessment result in the organization's database. A copy of the attestation hash is optionally anchored to an external immutable store (such as IPFS or a timestamp authority service) for independent verification. Auditors verify record integrity by: (1) requesting the remote attestation report from the hardware vendor's service, confirming the enclave measurement matches the expected assessment code, (2) recomputing the content and response hashes from stored data and comparing against the signed attestation, and (3) verifying the enclave signature against the hardware platform's public key. Any alteration to the assessment record at the database, operating system, or hypervisor level is detected because the recomputed hashes will not match the hardware-signed values. Distinguishing Characteristics This system provides integrity through a hardware root of trust, not through an application-layer state machine. There is no five-state validity lifecycle. There are no proposition-level validity bitmaps. There are no authority drift triggers or cryptographic integrity failure triggers managed by application logic. The integrity guarantee comes from silicon-level hardware isolation and hardware-signed attestation, which prevents tampering rather than detecting it after the fact. This is also distinct from blockchain-based approaches because there is no distributed consensus, no smart contracts, and no cross-organizational attestation protocol.
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Recommended Citation
Davis, Kenneth, "Hardware-Attested Assessment Execution in Trusted Execution Environments for Tamper-Evident Compliance Records", Technical Disclosure Commons, (March 25, 2026)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/9634