Abstract
Hardening secure integrated circuits such as security chips, processors, etc. against physical side-channel attacks is a complex task. Such hardening requires many iterations of design, and testing. Current countermeasures to mitigate side-channel leakage have significant overheads in terms of area, power, and/or performance. Moreover, such mechanisms may be ineffective against certain types of attacks and can potentially introduce new vulnerabilities. The mechanisms may be unsuitable in low-cost embedded systems with constraints on resources. This disclosure describes the use of a memory-mapped IP block that acts as a source or a sink for memory operations for out-of-range memory addresses. The block can reside as a peripheral on the common bus or can be a part of the memory controller. When a read operation on an out-of-range address is performed, the IP block returns a pseudo-random value. When a write operation to an out-of-range address is performed, the IP block sinks all writes, mimicking the behavior of actual memory that can be observed externally.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Sukhomlínov, Vadím and Osorio, Miguel, "Mitigation of Side-channel Attacks on Memory Operations Using Random Sink/Source", Technical Disclosure Commons, (November 04, 2024)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/7498