Abstract
Non-volatile memories (NVMs) such as phase change memory (PCM) have speeds, latencies, and bandwidths close to those of random access memory (RAM). The performance and economy of PCM (and other NVMs) have led computer system designers to use NVM as swap space. However, swap data can include user information, including potentially sensitive information. The storage of such information in a NVM swap partition can enable an attacker to steal information from a victim’s computer, e.g., by forcing it to sleep and then reading the content of the NVM in another system. Per the techniques of this disclosure, such attacks on the swap partition are foiled by encrypting (and possibly compressing) the swap partition, and by deleting or otherwise rendering unreadable the encryption (or compression) key.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Boerger, Marcus, "Automatic Erasure of Persistent Storage for Data Security", Technical Disclosure Commons, (May 07, 2020)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3218