Abstract
Client-server applications using asynchronous endpoints can be vulnerable to automated clients that bypass user interface (UI) rendering to directly invoke application programming interfaces. To address this, systems and methods are described for the cryptographic attestation of rendered UI intent. A cryptographic capability token can be generated after a backend system processes a request, binding the token to the canonical application state and a specific set of interactive options presented to the user. When a client makes a subsequent asynchronous request, a verifier component can validate this token to check that the requested action corresponds to an interaction that was rendered in the UI. This process can mitigate certain security vulnerabilities and can enable configurable, policy-driven enforcement actions based on the verification outcome, offering a more graduated response than a binary block-or-allow decision.
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Prabhakar, Ajay and Zohar, Dor, "Cryptographic Attestation of Rendered User Interface Intent for Securing Asynchronous Endpoints", Technical Disclosure Commons, (November 20, 2026)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/13178