Abstract
A system and method let an organization publish continuous, independently checkable evidence about its security safeguards without revealing the evidence itself. On a schedule, an open source collector reads configuration and status data from the organization's systems with read-only access, keeps only allowlisted fields, removes personal and sensitive details, records the identity of the collector code, adds a secret random nonce, and computes a cryptographic fingerprint of canonical JSON. The full evidence is stored privately. The fingerprint is timestamped through OpenTimestamps on the Bitcoin blockchain and appended to a public hash-chained log. Each control maps to external framework references, such as CIS Controls Implementation Group 1 safeguard numbers. A public page shows each result only after a fixed delay, such as 7 days. This gives a short, disclosed remediation window, while every failure stays timestamped and visible in the history. A buyer who receives an evidence file privately can hash it on their own device and match it to the public fingerprint and timestamp proof. Variants cover other schedules, delays, hash functions, commitment schemes, anchors, log formats, frameworks and operators, including managed service providers running the system for many organizations.
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
MELEAR, AARON, "Delayed public evidence of security safeguards using salted fingerprints, collector identity, a hash-chained log and Bitcoin timestamps (Truthbound)", Technical Disclosure Commons, ()
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/13154