Abstract
Cloud regions, data-residency settings and IP geolocation decide where AI infrastructure runs. They do not decide whether a specific output from a specific AI run may be sent to a specific destination, or whether the computation should have started at all under the model proposed for it. Outputs can still travel through APIs, proxies, CDNs, telecom paths or satellite relays into places never approved, and VPNs or CDNs can mask IP-based location.
Based on Indian Provisional Filing: 202631046739, filed 12 April 2026, and disclosed with the Mothership (PCT/IB2026/055615) on 16 July 2026.
This disclosure adds two hard boundaries:
- Before computation starts. A trusted execution environment or hardware security module fingerprints the proposed model. It releases the key or token that lets the GPUs start only if that fingerprint matches the one approved for the data. The heavy inference still runs on ordinary infrastructure.
- Before the output leaves. A small runtime descriptor of the run is formed and hashed. It is bound to a jurisdiction context (source, destination, legal basis such as an adequacy decision or standard contractual clauses, issuing authority) and signed with both RSA-4096 and post-quantum Dilithium signatures. The destination proves its jurisdiction through certificates, mobile network identifiers, satellite ground-station or sovereign-cloud credentials, not its IP address.
The output is released only when all of the following hold:
- the approved model ran;
- the run behaved within an approved class;
- the destination’s jurisdiction is verified;
- source and destination authorities have approved the corridor, where required;
- revocation, expiry and replay checks pass.
Otherwise the output is held, constrained, redirected or escalated.
Industry relevance (AI-generated). This section was prepared with AI assistance and shows potential fit and collaboration opportunities only. The architecture could add per-run algorithm control and per-output jurisdiction proofs to existing sovereignty products:
- United States:
- Microsoft’s EU Data Boundary and Azure confidential computing;
- Google sovereign cloud, Google Distributed Cloud and Confidential Space;
- AWS European Sovereign Cloud with KMS and Nitro Enclaves;
- Oracle EU Sovereign Cloud;
- Apple Private Cloud Compute;
- NVIDIA confidential GPUs and BlueField;
- OpenAI European data residency;
- Claude in EU regions through Bedrock, Vertex AI and Microsoft 365 Copilot.
- China:
- Alibaba Cloud, Huawei Cloud, Tencent Cloud and Baidu AI Cloud domestic and international regions;
- China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom networks.
- Europe:
- SAP and sovereign-cloud providers such as OVHcloud, T-Systems, Orange Business and Thales-backed offerings;
- Mistral AI and Aleph Alpha;
- Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefónica, Ericsson and Nokia network APIs (Aduna, Network as Code);
- GDPR Chapter V transfers.
- Satellite and others:
- Starlink, SES, Eutelsat OneWeb and Viasat ground stations;
- Indian operators and NPCI;
- Samsung and SK Telecom.
Latency and legacy. The algorithm check runs once per job, before inference. The release check uses fast hashing and signatures and can use pre-approved corridors and cached revocation status. Existing key-release services, certificates and network identifiers are reused, and models and GPUs stay where they are.
Filing details. Inventor: Sangam Das ([email protected]). The filing builds on Indian provisional 202631046689 (11 April 2026). The inventor is open to acquihire or strategic collaboration.
Disclaimer. The invention is the work of its human inventor. This title, abstract and the accompanying summary, including all company and product references, were prepared with AI assistance. Readers must cross-check every statement against the original filed documents on WIPO PATENTSCOPE and official company sources, and draw their own conclusions. Naming a company or product shows topical relevance only. It is not an endorsement, a validation, a criticism or a statement of infringement, and no company named is affiliated with the inventor. The application is pending, and nothing here is legal advice. Licence: CC BY-NC 4.0.
Keywords: AI safety; AI sovereignty; data residency; sovereign cloud; cross-border data transfer; jurisdiction-bound release; non-IP geolocation; certificate-based jurisdiction; PLMN; satellite ground station; confidential computing; TEE; HSM; attestation-based key release; model fingerprint; model allowlist; runtime descriptor; BLAKE2b; RSA-4096; Dilithium; post-quantum; OCSP; anti-replay; corridor approval; fail-closed; GDPR Chapter V; EU AI Act; China cross-border data rules; DPDP Act; EU Data Boundary; European Sovereign Cloud; Confidential Space; Nitro Enclaves; Private Cloud Compute; confidential GPU; Aduna
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Recommended Citation
Das, Sangam Kumar, "AI Safety Across Borders: Only Approved Algorithms Can Start, and Only Outputs Proven to Reach an Approved Jurisdiction Can Leave — Verified by Certificates, Telecom and Satellite Credentials Instead of IP Address", Technical Disclosure Commons, ()
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/13010