Abstract

This disclosure describes a method of certified provenance for the supply chain of AI systems and robots, from components to the sites where they run. The chain is divided into declared tiers: components (such as chips, sensors, batteries and modules), makers who build robots and systems, providers of skills and models, carriers and custodians who move, store, install, repair or refurbish equipment, and sites such as computing parks and data centres. Each tier is certified by accredited bodies under one published set of rules, and a certified supplier's live status is recorded in a public registry, where anyone can look it up. Every item of consequence carries a signed provenance chain: each party that makes, alters, moves, stores, installs or repairs it signs a record bound to the item's attested identity, so that the item can be traced back to its origins and forward to every machine and site that contains it. A robot, a system or a site is admitted to certified operation only when every link in the chains of its declared items verifies to a certified supplier. A break in custody, such as an unrecorded transfer, a broken tamper seal or an identity mismatch, is itself a finding. When a defect, counterfeit or fraud is found at any tier, the finding propagates through the provenance records to every affected item, machine and site in the field, which are restricted according to declared rules, much as a defective skill propagates through its lineage. A maker tier allows original equipment makers who build to the SI Standard to be certified and listed on equal published terms. Every certification, record, admission, refusal, finding and propagation is signed and recorded.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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