Abstract

Abstract (Part 24 of 27)

Organizations A and B appoint an autonomous supervisor to schedule a distributed maintenance task. At minute 14, B revokes the appointment while A is temporarily partitioned. The old supervisor has signed messages pending in a queue, and a remote task’s completion status is unknown. Simply deleting the supervisor process does not prevent an old queued message from reaching another service. Likewise, a signed revocation broadcast does not prove it was installed at a disconnected receiver. A replacement supervisor cannot safely assume an ambiguous external operation failed and repeat it. Appointing a supervisor is different from starting its process; an authenticated supervisor call is different from authorization of a native effect; expiry of future authority is different from undoing a committed effect; and failure to receive a remote response is different from evidence of non-commit.

Difference from earlier parts: Earlier embodiments control the joint plan, the freeze, evaluation, next-actor selection, role reconfiguration, selective communication, the next-move passport, Finality Sink enforcement, substitute selection, pending-work escrow, verified phase advancement, actual-outcome feedback, independent evaluator integrity, cross-domain partition recovery, protected session closure, cross-organizational supervisor appointment, independent evaluator appointment, cross-domain trust and policy compatibility, and leaderless coordination. This embodiment specifically controls the complete lifetime of any bounded cross-domain supervision or evaluation authority — time/event expiration, authenticated withdrawal, receipt of revocation under partitions, safe fencing generation, replacement, and recovery.

This embodiment (Part 24 of a 27-part series under Indian Patent Application Number 202631131650; full details at https://zenodo.org/records/23940766) creates a bounded supervisor appointment having exact task, principal roster, operation scope, instance identity, lease, phase, policy generation, and fencing epoch. Each required domain installs the authenticated appointment in protected storage. Admitted requests are independently checked against current local state, supervisor identity, signed organization status, freshness, and a one-time operation identifier. An authorized principal may issue a revocation that is source-authenticated, ordered by monotonic serial, and persisted as a tombstone before local fencing acknowledgement. Remote domains apply revocation upon receiving authenticated evidence, and otherwise cease admitting covered operations after a policy-defined bounded freshness interval. A successor appointment requires new authority, newer epoch, host binding, and independent old-generation fencing proofs; unresolved external outcomes require authoritative reconciliation. The architecture addresses local enforceability, bounded stale-knowledge exposure, safe replacement, and observable recovery. It does not claim instantaneous distributed revocation without additional communication and native enforcement assumptions.

The architecture therefore ensures that cross-domain supervisory or evaluator authority is time-bounded, revocable under partitions, and safely replaceable, without treating process deletion or lost messages as proof that authority has ended.

Keywords: multi-agent systems, agentic AI, AI safety, AI governance, self-expiring authority, authenticated revocation, generation-fenced replacement, fail-closed systems, zero-trust agents, time-bounded supervision, cross-organizational revocation, execution finality, protected failure recovery, monotonic generation fencing, bounded freshness interval, successor activation, local enforceability, stale-knowledge exposure, authority lifecycle, non-instantaneous distributed revocation.

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Creative Commons License
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