Abstract
Mechanisms for media provenance are implemented by having a device cryptographically sign a bundle of assertions/claims about the media of interest. These assertions/claims reveal information about the media file, such as whether the media came from the camera of the device, whether it was processed in some way, etc. The trustworthiness of media provenance assertions by such mechanisms is reliant on the signing device being uncompromised. This disclosure describes the use of steganographic techniques to prevent scalable abuse of media signing mechanisms through the use of compromised devices. Per the techniques, the signing mechanism is implemented to inspect media content (prior to signing) to detect the presence of a steganographic secret, which is used as a "kill switch" for the signing function. When a suspected compromised device (or a signing farm) is detected, specially-constructed media that includes the steganographic secret is submitted to such a device to secretly disable the signing function on the device.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Moles, Bryan Jeffery and Murray, Brian Jeremiah, "Steganography-based Anti-Abuse Mechanism for Media Provenance", Technical Disclosure Commons, ()
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/11389