Abstract
While the transition to 5G technology enable the potential for billons of connected network devices, supporting a wealth of new capabilities and innovations, it also introduces new vulnerabilities and threats such as compromised supply chain, compromised network element, legacy communications infrastructure, impact of compromised gNB-CU-UP over User Plane security. In short, if any of the 5G network element (gNB/AMF/UPF) is compromised i.e., it is no longer a trusted entity, which could introduce vulnerabilities and threats, ultimately 5G network would be exploited by malicious actors. Hence, before gNB connect to the AMF/UPF, the gNB should verify that the AMF/UPF is not compromised. Similarly, the AMF/UPF should ensure that only a trustworthy gNB connects to the AMF/UPF. Currently there are no methods which provide trustworthiness among gNB and AMF/UPF by exchanging integrity information between them over NGAP and GTP-U protocols. The techniques presented herein applies attestation method to NGAP and GTP-U protocol of 5G network for providing proof of integrity and freshness of proof of integrity between gNB and AMF (N2 Interface) and gNB and UPF (N3 Interface).
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
M M, Niranjan, "TRUSTED 5G NETWORK DEPLOYMENTS", Technical Disclosure Commons, (March 28, 2022)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/5023